

# Operating Systems Security – Assignment 4

2017/2018

Due Date: 14 Dec 2016 (23:59 CET)

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## 1 Play around with the `setuid` (suid) bit

In Week 1 lecture, you were introduced to the `setuid` bit. In this exercise, you will learn how to carry out *privilege escalation* using `suid`.

Login to your (Kali) Linux system as a **non-root** user and download the program `showdate` from <https://www.cs.ru.nl/~vmoonsamy/teaching/ossec2016/showdate> (for 64-bit OS).

Then, change the owner

```
$ sudo chown root:root showdate
```

set the `suid` bit and make it executable

```
$ sudo chmod u+s,a+x showdate
```

Execute the program and verify it prints the date correctly

```
$ ./showdate
```

```
Fri Nov 18 xx:xx:xx EST 2016
```

Install the tool `strace`

```
$ sudo apt-get install strace
```

and run it to see system calls used by `showdate`

```
$ strace -f ./showdate
```

### Objectives

- Find out what the program does internally. What system calls does it use?
- Assume the role of a non-privileged attacker. Use the program `showdate` to obtain a root shell. You can verify if you succeeded by looking at the output of `id`, it should be something like:  

```
$ /usr/bin/id
```

`uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),27(sudo),1001(test1)` Hand in the exact console commands you used to get this working.
- Explain what a developer could do to overcome this issue. What explicit actions should a developer take when writing software that is intended to be used with `setuid-root` to avoid these types of problems?

## 2 Trust models

In this exercise we consider a reference monitor which uses Mandatory Access Control (MAC) to implement the Bell-LaPadula and the Biba model. The Bell-LaPadula model uses levels **unclassified**  $\leq$  **confidential**  $\leq$  **secret**  $\leq$  **top secret**. The Biba model uses levels **untrusted**  $\leq$  **user**  $\leq$  **application**  $\leq$  **system**  $\leq$  **trusted**. The following objects with corresponding secrecy and trust levels are used in this exercise:

- /home/peter/database (confidential, user),
- /etc/password (confidential, trusted)
- /etc/shadow (top secret, trusted)
- /usr/bin/someprog (unclassified, application)
- /usr/lib/somelib.so (unclassified, system)
- Network socket to 203.0.113.42, port 80 (unclassified, untrusted)

### Objectives

- a) For each of the following steps determine whether the reference monitor will allow the action. If not, explain why not (if there are multiple reasons, state all).
  - i User peter logs in with clearance (secret, application) and tries to run /usr/bin/someprog.
  - ii The process dynamically loads (reads) /usr/lib/somelib.so.
  - iii The process reads /home/peter/database.
  - iv The process writes data to the network socket.
  - v The process reads /etc/password.
  - vi The process writes /etc/shadow.
- b) The process from part a) now creates a new file /home/peter/out. What are the permitted pairs of trust and secrecy level for this output file?